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Requirements quality has long been an issue in safety-critical development. Programme pressures and lack of 
understanding of user needs, combined with inadequate methods and tools, leads to incomplete and 
inconsistent requirements specification. This often results in poor-quality software and significant 
overspending on programmes.  
Requirements are generally verified early in the lifecycle using manual inspections. However, while the manual 
approach is valid for less complex systems, it is not adequate for systems with greater complexity and a 
complicated hierarchy of requirements. Another trend within UK Defence is the adoption of Closed Systems 
for mission- and safety-critical systems. As the name suggests, a Closed System is a solution which is available 
as a black box, where access to internal modules and design artefacts is not possible. In the context of this 
paper, we will refer to a Closed System as a software-based system which can refer to either of the following 
contexts: 
 
1. Systems developed by a third party that are commercially available to the public domain as 
readymade solutions; also known as COTS solutions. 
2. Systems developed by a third party that are not commercially available but, due to legal, export 
controls or other commercial reasons, are not open to the system integrator. 
The use of Closed Systems raises several challenges from a safety certification perspective: limited 
information, limited test coverage and non-deterministic behaviour of the Closed System in use. When the 
system under test is closed, a classic isolation testing approach is inadequate to demonstrate the reliability of 
safety-critical software, because proper coverage cannot be measured. Lacking proper coverage during the 
testing phase, the scenarios used may only test certain functions within the Closed System software. When the 
software is then used, functions that have not been tested may generate faults that could cause the system to 
behave in unexpected ways.  
 
A system architecture based on Closed Systems is particularly sensitive to obsolescence management issues. 
When a component (software, hardware or firmware) is upgraded, the system needs to go through regression 
testing. The key issues are to determine which tests need to be run to ensure that the integrated system 
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operates correctly with the new part, the impact of the new version of the software/hardware on the rest of 
the system and how to validate assumptions made about the new version of the software/hardware. 
Verification and Integration of Closed Systems through Formal Methods (VICS-FM), a new approach developed 
by Critical Software Technologies and the University of Southampton, uses a rigorous approach to extend the 
evidence provided by software verification processes
1
. The approach involves generating formal models to 
help provide further evidence relating to the behaviour of architectures with integrated Closed Systems, 
before having to run the Closed Systems in a test environment. This saves time and costs, increases confidence 
in the system and allows for any proposed updates to the Closed System to be assessed before they take 
place.  
The additional evidence provided by the formal modelling includes: 
 The ability to precisely define functional coverage and to measure the functional coverage of test 
sets. 
 The generation of test sets using the tools available in the formal approach. 
 Strong validation of models using proof and simulation tools, which validate the definition of 
functional behaviour and the functional coverage of tests. 
 The ability to support the evaluation and impact assessment of changes when a new version of the 
software/hardware is released. 
The VICS-FM approach offers a rigorous method to: 
 Strengthen the requirements and design of the system. 
 Validate assumptions about the solution. 
 Conduct ‘what-if’ analysis. 
 Identify which scenarios, if any, lead to the system being left in an unforeseen or undesired state, 
such as deadlock. 
 Generate an animated model and visualisations of the system using a graphical user-friendly 
interface, to help test and validate the formal models.  
The VICS-FM approach is based on the use of a formal modelling language (Event-B) which is based on set 
theory and supported by mathematical proof and model checking technology. Due to the formal method used, 
the responses provided by VICS-FM are unambiguous and trustworthy. VICS-FM is best used at earlier phases 
of the lifecycle, because it can identify problems with the requirements and can be used to confirm the 
suitability of the Closed System. The approach can also be used once the Closed System has been procured 
and installed.  
VICS-FM complements more traditional verification & validation approaches. In particular VICS-FM can be used 
to verify elements on the left-hand side of the V-Model. System, integration and acceptance tests are still 
required, but their scope can be reduced. When the VICS-FM approach is used with bespoke applications, unit 
tests are not normally required.  
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Innovation 
The VICS-FM approach is described below in the context of Closed Systems verification but it could also be 
applied to a bespoke system.  
The innovation in VICS-FM stems from the application of an existing method (Event-B) plus a toolset (Rodin) to 
solving the problem of how to verify and integrate Closed Systems. The model of the Closed System is 
sufficiently generic to be reusable in different contexts. The specific VICS-FM innovation did not involve any 
significant developments to the Rodin toolset.  
The approach proposed represents a considerable change in the use and successful integration of Closed 
Systems, using formal methods to guarantee their integration and functionality. 
The VICS-FM approach could be used in: 
 Verification and Validation of complex systems that use Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) solutions. 
 Verification of safety properties in mixed risk environments where COTS solutions are used by the 
underpinning platform. Typically in these environments, single failure scenarios can be verified 
through classical testing approaches but multiple failure scenarios are more difficult to verify. The 
VICS-FM approach will increase the assurance of these systems. 
 Supporting the integration of legacy systems with COTS solutions (for example, virtualisation 
middleware). Legacy systems do not always integrate directly with COTS solutions, therefore bespoke 
solutions are required. These solutions can be modelled and proven correct using this approach. 
 Requirements and design specification: VICS-FM can be used to verify properties and highlight gaps in 
requirements and design early in the development process. 
 
Solution 
The VICS-FM approach requires that the input specifications are translated to an Event-B model. This is done 
manually, using the Rodin toolset
2
. The Event-B models are constructed of variables, events – which perform 
actions on variables – and invariants, which allow the designer to specify the properties of the system that 
should be upheld. The proving and model checking capabilities of Rodin help indicate whether these 
invariants, and hence the associated properties, are maintained over the possible behaviour of the system that 
is encapsulated by the modelled events. The approach not only provides an indication of the changes that 
need to made in the case of the violation of any of the properties, but it also provides examples – i.e. particular 
sequences of events – where the properties are violated; from which the associated scenarios can be 
identified to help inform areas of uncertainty in the system behaviour as soon as possible.  
A case study used to evaluate the VICS-FM approach involved the integration of a closed COTS solution within 
an end-user system with particular safety and critical operational constraints. The COTS solution is a 
virtualisation middleware (VMWare) and the end-user system is a military system (mission critical) which, due 
to the security classification level, cannot be disclosed in this paper. Issues were found with standard testing 
approaches due to some inherent, non-deterministic behaviour of the COTS solution. In an attempt to combat 
this, some additional bespoke software was created to constrain the behaviour of the COTS solution, although 
it was not fully understood how the combination of the COTS solution with the end-user system and bespoke 
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software element affected the safety and operational constraints; partly due to the closed nature of the COTS 
solution, but also because of the complexities of the interaction. The VICS-FM approach was used to assist in 
the verification of the behaviour of the composed system in terms of the identified constraints. The Event-B 
model produced consisted of several parts: 
1. A model of the relevant behaviour of the COTS solution, based on documentation of the COTS 
solution and discussion with domain experts. It was not a requirement to model the entire COTS 
solution, only the subset of the behaviour which was relevant to the properties to be verified. As 
mentioned in the limitations later in the paper, it must be ensured that the assumptions and 
exclusions made during this process are recorded and agreed with the safety and engineering teams. 
As the verification involved the non-deterministic behaviour of the COTS solution, this was reflected 
by considering all possible combinations and sequences of the defined events for the model of the 
COTS solution in an abstract way. This meant that, not only was it possible to construct a suitable 
model of the COTS solution without requiring in-depth knowledge of the exact process sequences 
followed in different scenarios, but also that during model checking, any of the potential paths of the 
COTS solution could be encountered. 
2. A model of the applicable elements and available actions of the end user system, including the 
bespoke software mentioned above, and how these interact with the COTS solution. 
3. Global properties of the system, specified as invariants, corresponding to the constraints that require 
verification. In the case study identified above, the invariants corresponded to the properties of the 
system that the behaviour of the COTS solution should maintain due to the limits imposed by the 
bespoke software solution. 
To facilitate the generation of the models, especially for users who are less experienced in the approach, UML-
like diagrams and state machines can be generated in Rodin, from which the tool automatically generates the 
underlying Event-B model. In a simulation of the model, the user can step through the transitions (depicted in 
the example state machine, Figure 2 below) in an interactive fashion, whilst the Rodin toolset checks whether 
any of the transitions causes an invariant violation and flags them for the user. The UML-B tool in Rodin
3
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Figure 1: VICS-FM Approach 
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which provides the capability to produce and translate these diagrams, was used to generate the models of 
the COTS solution and end-user system mentioned above during the case study. 
After generating the Event-B model of the system the following actions can be conducted automatically using 
the Rodin toolset: 
1. A model consistency check, run using simulation and model checking (using the ProB tool
4
).  
2. Proof obligations are generated which, when proven, can demonstrate whether any of the defined 
actions invalidate any of the invariants regarding the variables being modified. In other words, proof 
obligations are generated to demonstrate that all possible outcomes of each action maintain the 
properties specified by the invariants. There are automatic proving capabilities within Rodin which 
assist in completing these proof obligations. 
3. The model checker can be run to find scenarios where particular invariants are violated, if the proof 
obligations cannot easily be discharged. This is useful for more complex behaviour and invariants, 
such as those encountered during the case study. These scenarios can be identified and typically 
correspond to areas of uncertainty, where it is important to have feedback as soon as possible. During 
the case study mentioned above, a scenario was highlighted which violated some of the safety and 
operational constraints. By examining the trace of events corresponding to this scenario – provided by 
the model checker – it was possible to understand which limitation or specific behaviour of the 
bespoke software caused the violation of the constraint. Figure 3 below gives an example of the use 
of the model checker; the violated invariant is shown in red and the trace of events that led up to the 
violation is displayed in the history tab on the right-hand side. 
Figure 2: Example of Event-B State Machine 
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4. The Event-B model can be animated within Rodin using the BMotion Studio tool, which is part of 
ProB. Using the tool,  it is possible to generate an animated front-end to the simulation of the model 
in the form of a user-friendly graphical interface, which corresponds to the system’s GUI (see Figure 
4). The user can interact directly with this animated front-end, while the tool continues to run the 
formal analysis in the background, reacting to user choices and checking the model and invariants at 
each step. This was utilised during the case study, to produce a representation of the GIU provided as 
part of the end-user system. As this graphical representation is tied to the underlying Event-B model, 
it can not only be used to run through the model and confirm that the model is the correct 
representation of the system, but can also be used to explore further scenarios. This graphical 
representation of the system can be used without necessarily requiring any experience with the 
Event-B language or the toolset.  
Figure 3: Example of the model checker in use 
Figure 4: Example of a BMotion Studio visualisation 
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Benefits 
The VICS-FM method lends itself to finding inconsistencies in the requirements specification. The set theory 
that supports the method and the proof obligation mechanism forces the engineer to think further and to 
specify properties that are implicit, but not necessarily specified in the requirements, as inputs. Any 
inconsistencies between the requirements are identified and fed back to the requirements owner.  
Another useful mechanism offered by the Event-B method is refinement. This allows the model to start in a 
very abstract form, and gradually be refined by adding further properties and detail at each step, whilst 
ensuring that consistency is maintained with all previous refinement levels of the model. In the context of 
Verification and Validation (V&V), this mechanism enables the tailoring of the Event-B model to include only 
that which is strictly required to prove specific properties. This mechanism is critical in the context of 
Independent Software Verification and Validation (ISVV) activities, because the time available for conducting 
an ISVV activity is often limited and therefore it is not possible to translate the entire system into an Event-B 
model. 
Another advantage of this approach is that is promotes model reuse. The model of the Closed System can be 
considered separate and therefore reused and applied to validate the integration of other systems that 
interface with the same Closed System. In addition, if further properties need to be specified for the system in 
the Event-B model, this can be factored into the process by refining the existing system model and adding the 
relevant extra behaviour in this additional refinement. Adding extra properties (for instance, an extra 
requirement) does not necessarily involve modifying the existing model, or having to re-prove any of the 
existing proof obligations, as these extra properties are introduced and tested in an additional refinement 
level. This adds flexibility as to when the formal verification is used: the main model can easily be picked up at 
later stages should the customer be unsure about a particular, perhaps newly-developed, property. 
The project in which the VICS-FM Approach was used had a duration of 5 months and for that reason the 
chosen case study and the Event-B model generated had to be tailored. Considering these constraints it was 
possible to identify one scenario where the real system would be left in an undesirable state. This finding was 
achieved with an effort of approximately 3 man-months, which includes analysis of the requirements and 
discussion, generation of the Event-B models and “execution” of models. The provider of the case study came 
to the same conclusion using a classical testing approach but with an effort of approximately 12 man-months.  
The reason for the extra effort using the classical testing approach is mainly because of the non-deterministic 
nature of the virtualisation platform and the use of the manual approach in testing.  Using the VICS-FM 
approach the identification of scenarios where the system could be left in an undesirable state requires less 
time and effort. In terms of scalability, it is known that the underlying toolset has been used with models of 
considerable size 
5, 6, 7
. The key issue when the size of the models increases relates to proof generation, which 
is not fully automated and sometimes requires manual intervention to discharge. This is not an issue with the 
VICS-FM approach but rather an issue with the Rodin toolset and the theorem provers used. 
In summary, the VICS-FM approach: 
 Provides a sound model of the requirements selected for modelling, so that any ambiguity within 
these can be removed. 
 Improves the integration of Closed Systems, supporting the relevant safety cases and reducing costs 
throughout the V&V cycle. 
 Enables precise definition of functional coverage.  
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 Enables the measurement of the functional coverage of test sets. 
 Strengthens the requirements and design of the system. 
 Validates assumptions about the solution and facilitates ‘what-if’ analysis, in particular around safety 
and availability requirements. 
 Identifies which scenarios, if any, lead to the system being left in an unforeseen or undesired state, 
such as deadlock. 
 Includes strong validation of the models using proof and simulation tools, which validates the 
definition of functional behaviour and the functional coverage of tests. 
 Allows for the formal model of the Closed System(s) to be reused in different industrial contexts. 
 Is flexible in facilitating changes to the requirements and software versions due to the inherent 
refinement mechanism. 
 Indicates if these changes affect previously defined properties. 
Limitations 
1. The resulting Event-B model is only a representation of a subset of the end system and Closed System. 
To address any potential shortfalls of the Event-B Model, a strategy has to be identified and agreed 
with the safety and systems engineering team with regard to which properties need to be formally 
verified. This will then define which aspects of the Closed System are modelled and which elements of 
the rest of the system remain to be modelled. The level of confidence in the evidence collected using 
other approaches (classic testing), plus scenarios which are hard to verify or simply cannot be verified 
by running the system over longer and longer timescales, should be taken into account to decide what 
will be formally modelled using Event-B.  
2. Due to the fact the Event-B model generated covers only a subset of the real system, the outputs of 
the proofs and simulations run are limited to the elements modelled in Event-B. Depending on the 
issues that need to be verified, this could become a limiting contingent on the expected outcomes of 
the verification activity and the dependencies within the inner elements of the Closed System. Using 
abstractions, it is possible to focus on and expand higher-level elements of the system, if that makes 
the model more representative. 
3. Any assumptions about the underlying behaviour of the Closed System must be documented and 
discussed with the safety and engineering team to ensure that they are justified.  
4. The Event-B method and the Rodin toolset are not yet capable of verifying certain performance 
requirements such as confirming the time it takes to perform particular tasks. Therefore, the required 
availability of certain resources used by the system must be ascertained using a different approach. 
5. VICS-FM is fundamentally geared towards the verification of safety-critical software. It is a sound 
approach that provides rigorous evidence to support the safety case. Nevertheless, the approach still 
requires specialist knowledge in set theory and the Event-B method, hence it is not straightforward to 
learn and must be practised by an experienced engineer. 
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